Sequential versus Simultaneous Auctioning of Procurement Contracts with Common Value and Private Value Components

We study procurement auctions held in sequential and simultaneous formats. For thelatter format, we find less bid participation and more aggressive bidding for projects withstrong common value components and more competition for projects having strong privatevalue components.microeconomics ;

Nach dem Erfurter Urteil: Zersplitterung der Tariflandschaft nicht zu befürchten

Vor kurzem ließ das Bundesarbeitsgericht den lange Zeit geltenden Grundsatz der Tarifeinheit in seiner Rechtsprechung fallen. So ist es nun möglich, dass in einem Betrieb unterschiedliche Tarifverträge für die angehörigen verschiedener Gewerkschaften gelten. Der Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund und die Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände traten im Gegenzug für eine gesetzliche Verankerung der eben erst gelösten Tarifeinheit ein. Sie befürchten eine Zersplitterung der Tariflandschaft und behaupten, dass es zu mehr Arbeitskämpfen kommen könnte. Auch wenn ohne Tarifeinheit die Bedeutung von Spartengewerkschaften - auch durch Neugründungen - wachsen wird, sollte bedacht werden, dass Arbeitnehmer aus verhandlungstheoretischer Sicht nach wie vor Anreize hätten, sich innerhalb einzelner Berufsgruppen zu großen Gewerkschaften zusammenzuschließen. Darüber hinaus stehen derzeit noch andere institutionelle Anforderungen an die Tariffähigkeit von Gewerkschaften einer Aufteilung der Arbeitnehmer im Weg. Außerdem sollte aus Sicht der Arbeitnehmer berücksichtigt werden, dass getrennte Tarifverhandlungen auch Risiken bezüglich eventuell negativer Wechselwirkungen zwischen den Beschäftigtengruppen bergen.Union formation, Collective wage agreements

The impact of timing on bidding behavior in procurement auctions of contracts with private costs

We provide a comparison of bidding behavior between multi-round and single-round auctions considering bid lettings for asphalt construction contracts. Using a reduced-form difference-in-difference approach as well as the nonparametric estimation technique proposed by Racine and Li (2004) we find that, bidding is more aggressive in a sequential multi-round setting than in a simultaneous single-round format. We explore potential causes for the bidding difference across formats related to synergies and level of bidder participation.Multi-unit auctions, Procurement auctions

The impact of timing on bidding behavior in procurement auctions of contracts with private costs

We provide a comparison of bidding behavior between multi-round and single-round auctions considering bid lettings for asphalt construction contracts. Using a reduced-form difference-in-difference approach as well as the nonparametric estimation technique proposed by Racine and Li (2004) we find that, bidding is more aggressive in a sequential multi-round setting than in a simultaneous single-round format. We explore potential causes for the bidding difference across formats related to synergies and level of bidder participation

The impact of timing on bidding behavior in procurement auctions of contracts with private costs

We provide a comparison of bidding behavior between multi-round and single-round auctions considering bid lettings for asphalt construction contracts. Using a reduced-form difference-in-difference approach as well as the nonparametric estimation technique proposed by Racine and Li (2004) we find that, bidding is more aggressive in a sequential multi-round setting than in a simultaneous single-round format. We explore potential causes for the bidding difference across formats related to synergies and level of bidder participation

The impact of timing on bidding behavior in procurement auctions of contracts with private costs

We provide a comparison of bidding behavior between multi-round and single-round auctions considering bid lettings for asphalt construction contracts that are known to have primarily private costs. Using a reduced-form difference-in-difference approach as well as the nonparametric estimation technique that was proposed by Racine and Li (J Econom 119(1):99–130, 2004) we find that bidding is more aggressive in a sequential multi-round setting than in a simultaneous single-round format. We explore potential causes for the bidding difference across formats that are related to synergies and the level of bidder participation